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Statutory enhancement to U.S. national security policy is not
primarily a matter of trying to write into law the substance of wise
policy. Past attempts to do so, such as congressional restrictions on
aid or trade with certain out-of-favor regimes, have produced rigidity
and inflexibility that policyrnakers in the executive branch have
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overcome only with liberal use of waivers. To be successful, foreign
policy needs to be nimble and capable of responding to emergent
opportunities and threats. Enshrining any one approach, however
wise it may seem at the moment, in a statute precludes the required
agility.
Legislation has been a vehicle for another favorite approach to-
ward supposed enhancement of U.S. national security: reorganization.
Redrawing of the Government's organization chart clearly requires
legislation, but the frequency with which would-be reformers have
turned to this device reflects less a need for it than the attraction of
reorganization as a specific, visible, response to demands to "do
something" after salient failures. Redrawing lines does not eliminate
challenges inherent to some security problems, the chance of being
counterproductive is significant, and any reorganization entails costs
of disruption. One of the biggest reorganizations related to national
security in recent years-adoption in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission's
redo of the intelligence community-is illustrative. Supposedly a fix
for inadequate flow of information across bureaucratic lines, it
created still more lines across which information must flow. As
underscored by subsequent incidents such as an attempted bombing
of a Detroit-bound airliner in December 2009, it did not overcome
the inherent difficulty of trying to identify terrorism-related fragments
amid a sea of similar but irrelevant information.
The greatest shortcoming related to American national security
which a statutory fix might ameliorate concerns not substance or
structure but rather process. The process for making national security
policy decisions, even ones involving major departures, has too often
been restricted and truncated. Too few options have been thoroughly
considered, too few sources of insight and expertise have been
tapped, and too few relevant factors have been considered. This
shortcoming has varied from issue to issue and from administration to
administration, but even the best examples have exhibited it to some
degree. The work of the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council, or ExComm, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
has been cited ever since as a model of thorough deliberation leading
to a successful outcome. But the deliberations were not as thorough
as they could have been. The option of allowing the missiles to remain
in Cuba was never seriously considered.'
1. This gap in the decision-making is discussed in STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, WAR
AND HuMAN NATURE 58-64 (2005).
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When the administration of LyndonJohnson embarked on the
Vietnam War a few years later, a seemingly thorough engagement of
the bureaucracy lay behind the decision. But in fact the most
important decisions about the war were reached in a very small circle
of Johnson and his senior advisers, especially in a weekly gathering
2
known as the Tuesday lunch. The circle exemplified groupthink, in
which the very mutual respect that keeps the group cohesive inhibits
the questioning of assumptions underlying decisions the group
makes. With the Vietnam War the principal unquestioned, and
incorrect, assumptions were that the fall of Vietnam to communists
would lead to a series of other dominoes falling, and that a withdrawal
of the United States from its Vietnam commitment would severely
damage U.S. credibility.
The extreme case of a major policy decision being reached
through a deficient process was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which
did not result from any policy process at all . There was no meeting,
no options paper, and no other forum within the executive branch to
provide input to the presidential decision to launch the war. Many
meetings addressed the mustering of public support for the war and
some addressed the execution of the decision, but none considered
whether the war was a good idea in the first place.
Presidents get the kind of policy process they want (if they want
one at all). The thorough and orderly consideration of policy options
within the executive branch has to result from directions from the
Chief Executive much more than from statutes. Significant depar-
tures related to national security, however, must involve Congress as
well. The most significant departures involve the use of military force.
As the Vietnam and Iraq examples indicate, such departures also have
involved some of the greatest deficiencies in policy deliberations.
The role of Congress in decisions to use military force has been,
since the slide into disuse of the constitutional power to declare war, a
2. See generally HENRY F. GRAFF, THE TUESDAY CABINET: DELIBERATION AND
DECISION ON PEACE AND WAR UNDER LYNDON B. JOHNSON (1970) (describing the
composition and function of President Johnson's Tuesday Cabinet during major
events of the Vietnam War).
3. See IRVINGJANIs, GRourmINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIAsCOES 101 (2d ed. 1983).
4. With regard to President George W. Bush's Post-9/11 foreign policy, former
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage opined, "There was never any policy
process to break, by [then national security advisor] Condi [Rice] or anyone else.
There was never one from the start. Bush didn't want one for whatever reason. One
was never started." RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 225 (2006).
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recurring and unresolved issue. The most significant attempt to
resolve it was the passage in 1973 of the War Powers Resolution, which
restricts how long the president can commit U.S. forces to armed
action without explicit authorization by Congress.5 The resolution,
which was enacted over a veto by President Richard Nixon, has had a
troubled history amid questions about its constitutionality. For the
purpose of encouraging more orderly and thorough policy delibera-
tions, however, the question of distribution of war-making powers
between the executive and legislative branches does not have to be
attacked as directly as the authors of the War Powers Resolution
attempted to do. Congress should be regarded less as a constraint on
presidential powers than as a vehicle for insisting on more careful
thinking about exercise of those powers.
A promising way of fostering that congressional role would be a
modified version of a draft statute proposed by the War Powers
Commission, an unofficial body convened by the Miller Center at the
University of Virginia and co-chaired by two former Secretaries of
State, James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher.6 The proposal
would not significantly reduce the ability of the President to employ
armed force even if a majority in Congress disagreed. But if U.S.
forces were to engage in any "significant armed conflict" the Presi-
dent would be required to consult with a Joint Congressional
Consultation Committee comprising the party leaders in both houses
and the chairmen and ranking members of relevant standing and
select committees.7 Before approving entry into combat, the Presi-
dent would have to submit a classified written report addressing "the
circumstances necessitating the significant armed conflict, the
objectives, and the scope and duration of the conflict."
8
A useful modification to the proposal would be to require even
more analysis and justification in the President's report. The report
should identify the specific U.S. interests at stake, describe the
different options for dealing with the situation, explain why the
option using armed force was chosen, specify all the assumptions
underlying the analysis, identify the risks, and estimate the costs. A
further modification would be to require an unclassified version of
the report as an input to public debate.
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2006).
6. SeeJAMEsA. BAKER ETAL., NATIONAL WAR PowERs COMMISSION REPORT 44-48
(2008).
7. Id. at 46.
8. Id.
[Vol. 36:55160
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Such requirements would not guarantee a thorough policy
process, but they would lessen the chance that the most glaring
deficiencies of the past would recur in the future. Merely having to
address certain questions would force them to the surface in discus-
sions in the executive branch. And Congress would be a more
meaningful participant than it was in the cursory considerations that
led to passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and the
resolution thirty-eight years later authorizing the Iraq War.
6. WHAT CHANGE BY EXECUTIVE ORDER IS MOST NECESSARY FOR
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY?
The objective addressed in the previous question-more tho-
rough deliberation on major questions of national security policy-
can be further pursued by institutionalizing appropriate procedures
within the executive branch. Proposing an executive order along this
line is admittedly a bit circular because the Presidents most likely to
sign such an order would be the ones who least need it, being already
attuned to the importance of policymaking rigor. But institutionaliza-
tion even of habits exhibited by the person at the top can ingrain
those habits more deeply and instill them in subordinates.
Perhaps the best model from the past was a National Security
Council Planning Board that President Dwight Eisenhower created
according to his specifications. Staffed by senior planners from all the
relevant departments, the board was charged with debating the costs
and benefits of alternative foreign policy strategies. 9 The approach
the board embodied reflected the superlative organizational and
planning skills Eisenhower himself had displayed during his military
career. Unfortunately the subsequent administration of John
Kennedy discontinued the board, hoping to make the National
Security Council more flexible.
An executive order re-establishing such a planning board could
add some embellishments. In particular, the board's analysis could be
required to address not only direct costs and benefits but also trade-
offs with interests other than those directly involving national security.
A recent example of this sort of trade-off arose with the Obama
administration's response to the attempted terrorist bombing of an
airliner bound for Detroit in December 2009. In a directive that
showed the difficulty of coming up with new ideas that could be
9. Aaron L. Friedberg, The LongHaul: Fighting and FundingAmerica's Next Wars,
FOREIGN AFF.,July-Aug. 2007, at 140, 146.
20101 5161
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described as corrective steps, the most significant measure the
President announced was a review of criteria for listing people to be
subject to secial security scrutiny when they fly or to be denied a seat
altogether. This is appropriately a matter for the President (and for
Congress), and notjust for intelligence or security agencies. It is an
issue of how much security Americans want to buy at the price of
reduced privacy and increased inconvenience while traveling. It is the
kind of weighing of different considerations in the public interest that
a sound institutionalized policymaking procedure would ensure.
7. How DO THE ABUSES OF CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE GEORGE W.
BUSH ADMINISTRATION COMPARE TO THE INTERNMENTS OFJAPANESE
ALIENS AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II?
The public sense of what constitutes an abuse varies with the pre-
vailing political and social climate. Standards change, sometimes
dramatically and within a remarkably short span of time. The
standards that underlay public acceptance of the forced relocation of
American citizens during World War II merely because of their ethnic
background now seem remote, unfamiliar, and unjustifiable. The
remoteness seems all the greater because several decades and a
couple of generations have passed since the World War II intern-
ments.
Controversial actions the George W. Bush administration took in
the name of counterterrorism instead occurred only a few years ago.
Views of those actions today, however, also reflect changing standards.
Some of the most controversial of the Bush administration's meas-
ures, including torture of detainees and warrantless interception of
communications of U.S. persons, were branded as abuses and stopped
not just because what had been done in secret later became public
knowledge. Such actions were first taken and then ceased because the
militant public mood in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack-which
tolerated or even demanded a very broad interpretation of what the
government ought to do in the name of national security-evolved
into something less militant as time went by without another major
terrorist attack on U.S. soil.
We need to bear in mind such changing of standards as we pro-
nounce judgment on abuses, or what we choose to characterize as
10. See Presidential Memorandum Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attad
Jan. 7,2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-
regarding-12252009-attempted-terrorist-attack.
[Vol. 36:55162
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abuses. Evaluation of any action, and assessment of the seriousness of
any abuse, can be performed according to the standards that pre-
vailed at the time the action was taken, or according to current
standards. The natural tendency is to use current standards, and such
use might be justified on grounds that current standards represent
moral growth and maturity beyond what came before. This is how the
great majority of America would today look back on the World War II
internments. Almost no one now tries to justify them, and they are
widely regarded as among the blackest marks in American history. If
we are to use current standards, however, we must realize that those
standards also will probably be replaced by something else in the
future. Moreover, the evolution of standards is not always one-way
moral growth. Sometimes it is more the swinging of a pendulum, with
future changes entailing a reversion to earlier perspectives.
A related question is whether standards should change. An argu-
ment in favor of the proposition that they should is that security
challenges and dangers change, and thus the criteria for selecting
measures to meet those challenges and dangers need to change with
them. An opposing view is that fixed principles are required to avoid
boundless moral relativism."
Moral philosophers have argued about such questions for centu-
ries and will continue to do so, but some more specific observations
can be made about domestic security that relate more directly to the
cases at hand, especially the Bush administration's counterterrorist
measures. Despite the common tendency for public discourse about
counterterrorism to be phrased in absolute terms, with talk about
doing whatever it takes to keep the American people safe, the real
policy issues do not involve absolutes. Doing as much as possible to
keep Americans safe from terrorism would involve turning the United
States into a tightly controlled police state, which no American wants.
The issues instead are questions of how much security Americans
collectively want to buy at the price of how much reduction in privacy
or civil liberty or increase in inconvenience. Curtailing civil liberties is
not necessarily an abuse if-perhaps a big "if" in the case of some of
the Bush administration's actions-the curtailment is in line with the
public preference of where to strike the security-vs.-liberty balance.
Another consideration relevant to both cases is whether the cli-
mate of opinion, which sets the standards of what does or does not
11. A leading example of the latter viewpoint as applied to actions during war is
found in MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977).
51632010]
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constitute an abuse, reflects the need to meet actual security chal-
lenges, or instead reflects something less defensible. The internment
of theJapanese-Americans is worthy of condemnation partly because
the action was motivated not solely by a desire to reduce the danger of
Japanese sabotage but also by ethnic prejudice.
In subsequent decades, American attitudes toward terrorism, and
by implication of measures taken to counter terrorism, have fluc-
tuated markedly for reasons other than the actual severity of the
terrorist threat. In the mid-1970s, for example, terrorism within the
United States was far more frequent and extensive than it has been in
the years since 9/11. Attacks ranged from car bombs on the streets of
Washington to the bombing of railroad stations in New York,
committed by perpetrators ranging from leftist radicals to Puerto
Rican nationalists. And yet there was no "War on Terror" and no
public acceptance of-much less a demand for-intrusive new
security measures to curb the terrorism. This was because the
prevailing political mood among Americans at the time, having just
come off the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair, favored the
curbing rather than the expansion of governmental powers.12
Similarly, the sudden and drastic increase in American public
acceptance of a host of new security measures in the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist attack in September 2001 did not reflect any
actual change in the threat--only a change in public fears. Such
measures were no more useful in countering terrorism on September
12 than they would have been on September 10.
To the extent that the Bush administration was responding to
this sea change in the public mood, one could say that some of what
later came to be regarded as abuses was an excusable implementation
of the alteration the American public was demanding in the security-
vs.-civil liberties balance. The excuse wore thin as the shock of 9/11
wore off and the public mood became more one of the administra-
tion's own making. The administration had other reasons to foster a
climate of fear, including an ideologically-based desire to assert
executive power and especially the selling of an offensive war in Iraq
conducted under the label of "War on Terror."
Several other criteria are relevant to assessing the seriousness of
abuses. One is transparency: the extent to which the public (or
congressional overseers) know what's going on. This was not an issue
12. See PHILIPJENKINS, IMAGES OFTERROR: WHATWE CAN AND CAN'T KNOWABOUT
TERRORISM 31-66 (2003).
5164 [Vol. 36:5
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with the World War II internments, which were public knowledge. It
was, however, an issue with some of the Bush administration's
initiatives, some of which may have been briefed to the overseers in
cursory or incomplete fashion.
Another criterion is whether controversial measures are necessary
to achieve their stated goal or whether other, less intrusive or
otherwise less extreme, means are available to accomplish the same
purpose. The internments are all the more inexcusable to the extent
that other means of preventing potential Japanese sabotage or
espionage within the United States had not been fully utilized. The
one action by the Bush administration for which this criterion is most
relevant was the interception of communications involving U.S.
persons without obtaining a warrant under the procedures of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The key issue was not
the usefulness of the intercepted communications but instead
whether the effectiveness of the intelligence collection operations
would have been impaired in any way by following the FISA proce-
dures. Given the FISA court's record of approving nearly every past
request, it is difficult to see how it would have been.
Yet another criterion is effectiveness: how well the measure in
question advances its stated goal. Possibly the internments impaired
Japanese subversion, but this would be a difficult case to make. The
Bush administration's action that most acutely raised the question of
effectiveness was the torture of terrorist suspects. The proven
instances of detainees providing bad information and saying what they
believed their tormentors wanted to hear makes torture an ineffective
measure even if it did not have to be balanced against the inhumanity
of the practice."'
A single weighing of the World War II internments and some of
the counterterrorist practices of the Bush administration is not
feasible. The internment camps represented a gross deprivation of
civil liberty for many innocent people, although not inhumane
treatment. Some of the Bush-era practices involved very mild
infringements on the privacy of undetermined numbers of people,
most of whom were innocent, and in the case of torture, inhumane
treatment of small numbers of people, most of whom probably were
guilty. The term abuse is appropriately applied to each, but it is a
comparison of apples and oranges.
13. Paul R. Pillar, No Torture. NoExceptions, WASH. MoNTHLYJan.-Mar. 2008, at
20101 5165
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8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
Of course al Qaeda does not pose an existential threat to the
United States, or anything close to such a threat. It is preposterous to
think that a small terrorist group could threaten the existence of the
most powerful nation on the planet, which is far above any other
nation in economic or military strength, steeled through more than
two centuries of challenge and growth, and one of the most firmly
established representative democracies ever. Al Qaeda was nowhere
close to being an existential threat even at the apogee of its own
strength, about the time of the 9/11 attack. Even 9/11, the most
spectacular, off-the-charts terrorist attack in modem history in terms
of both the death toll and its political and psychological impact, did
not come close to endangering the foundations and vitality of the
United States.
Al Qaeda is farther still from being such a threat now, after nine
years in which it has suffered more pressure and setbacks than growth.
Al Qaeda-meaning the group led by Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-
Zawahiri and mostly holed up in the hinterland of South Asia-now
comprises only a segment of the larger radical, Sunni, violence-prone
Islamist movement, to which the label "al Qaeda" sometimes is loosely
and misleadingly applied. Even the movement as a whole does not
come anywhere close to constituting an existential threat to the
United States. The extent of its capabilities to harm the United States
is illustrated more by the highly publicized incident in December
2009 in which a Nigerian backed by the group calling itself al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula unsuccessfully attempted to detonate
explosive underwear on a flight to Detroit.
Such operational ineffectiveness on the part of terrorists, and the
absence of any significant terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland in
nearly a decade, does not reassure those who point to al Qaeda's
proven interest in acquiring what are usually labeled weapons of mass
destruction, and to the specter that someday it might acquire such
weapons. The possibility of terrorists acquiring or fabricating a
nuclear fission device is the specific specter most frequently invoked . 4
Nuclear terrorism has become the de rigueur response, by politicians
and others, to the question of what is the greatest security threat
facing the United States. Moving beyond required mantras to more
14. See, e.g., GRAHAM T. ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE
PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE (2005).
5166 [Vol. 36:5
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careful analysis, however, shows the likelihood of this threat materia-
lizing, at the hands of al Qaeda or any other terrorist group, to be
extremely small.I And to speak directly to the question of existential
threats, even if this particular threat were to materialize it would not
endanger the existence-or destroy the economy or social fabric--of
the United States, any more than the detonation of nuclear bombs
over two Japanese cities in 1945 had that effect on Japan.1
6
The posing of the question about al Qaeda as an existential
threat points to two other patterns that do not help U.S. security.
One is excessive and exaggerated use of the term "existential." It has
become an all-purpose amplifying adjective whose use is divorced
from the literal meaning. Truly existential threats are extremely rare.
Rome was an existential threat to Carthage in the Third Punic War,
for example, in which the Romans followed up their victory by
reducing Carthage to rubble and killing or enslaving its citizens. The
unhelpful modern use of the term involves countries other than the
United States justifying all manner of responses to supposedly
"existential" threats. The term ought to be consigned to John-Paul
Sartre and those other existentialists who could be found smoking
cigarettes in Left Bank cafes.
The other pattern is American overreaction to terrorist threats.
Substantially more costs have been incurred and harm has been done
by resonses to terrorism, or to the fear of it, than by the terrorism
itself.' Al Qaeda will harm the United States more by provoking such
responses than through any physical harm it is able to inflict.
9. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO IF IT CONFIRMS THAT
IRAN HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
This question differs somewhat from the most commonly posed
question about Iran and nuclear weapons, which is what should be
done to prevent Iran from obtaining such weapons. Many of the same
considerations apply in answering each question. The principal
difference is that if Iran had already established a nuclear weapons
15. The most thorough and dispassionate recent analysis of the topic is BRIAN
MICHAELJENKINS, WILL TERRORISTS Go NUCLEAR? (2008).
16. John Mueller, Nuclear weapons: president Obama's pledge to rid the world of atomic
bombs is a waste of breath. But not for the reasons you might imagine, FOREIGN POL'YJan.-
Feb. 2010, at 38, 40.
17. See JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How PoLmcIANS AND THE TERRORISM
INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SEcuRTY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 29-39
(2006).
51672010]
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capability, the danger and thus the folly of striking Iran with military
force would be even greater than if Iran had not crossed that
threshold.
The costs and risks of trying to use military force to set back an
Iranian nuclear weapons capability would be prohibitive in any case,
whether or not the threshold had yet been crossed. Such an attack
would not eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons capability or the ability to
achieve one, given the hiding and dispersal of Iranian nuclear
facilities (and any extant weapons) and the fact that much of that
capability would reside in human knowledge and expertise. Such an
act of war would redouble Iranian determination to achieve (or
restore) a nuclear weapons capability. The rest of the Iranian
response would be more obviously damaging, including likely military
action in the Persian Gulf that would interrupt oil exports and cause
oil prices to skyrocket, as well as terrorist attacks against U.S. interests
at times and places of Iranian choosing. The political consequences
would include boosting the power and standing of hardliners in
Tehran and setting back the prospects for favorable political change
in Iran.
The United States has had experience in accustoming itself to
acquisition of nuclear weapons by feared or hostile states. The first of
those was the Soviet Union of Joseph Stalin as the Cold War was
getting into high gear. Then there was China, which when it
conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 was seen as a radical and
unpredictable state and was about to embark on the disorder and
revolutionary mania of the Cultural Revolution. After that was
Pakistan, with the anxiety surrounding the development of the first
"Islamic bomb." All of these we now accept as established nuclear
powers despite the earlier fears. In the case of Russia and the Soviet
Union, a relationship of nuclear deterrence has remained stable for
over sixty years despite conflicts and upheavals that included dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union itself.
There is no reason the same pattern cannot prevail with Iran. If
Iran acquires nuclear weapons then the United States should do what
it can to foster stable relationships of nuclear deterrence, both
between Iran and itself and between Iran and its neighbors in the
Middle East. Drawing lessons from the earlier development of stable
deterrence with the USSR, this means attention to such things as
transparency, confidence-building measures, and encouragement of
force structures that do not favor a first strike.
There is little else the United States would need to change in its
5168 [Vol. 36:5
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policies toward the Persian Gulf region, because a nuclear weapons
capability would change little in Iran's regional policies. Iran already
has conventional military superiority over its Arab neighbors on the
other side of the Gulf, and it is difficult to envision how a threat to
employ nuclear weapons would figure into those relationships. Not
being suicidal, Iranian leaders would have no incentive to do anything
else with those weapons that would bring ruin down on themselves.
The principles of deterrence are not repealed even when one of the
parties to a deterrent relationship wears a beard and turban.
10. WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S
NUMBER-ONE POWER?
It is impossible to apply a timetable to the rise or decline of any
power. This is partly because of the uncertainties facing any such
prognostication that looks out more than a few years, and partly
because of the different scales of economic, military, and other forms
of power one could apply to such rankings. Two general observations
can be made, however, about the standing of the United States over
the next several years. The first is that the United States is so far
ahead of the pack on most conventional measures of national power
that it will not be eclipsed any time soon."' The second is that the
conventional wisdom about other rising powers such as China and
India has become so conventional that it tends to overlook some
factors that, upon closer examination, will tend to work in favor of the
United States. One such factor is the aging of populations, which will
affect the United States less severely than most other major powers. 1
But what does--or should--"number one" mean? Traditional
measures of hard power such as military might or economic strength
are not the only ways to assess the stature or standing of nation states.
In addition there is "soft power"--the cultural and other bases for
influence and attraction that also have served the United States 
well.20
Soft power is in many ways more perishable than the hard variety,
18. See William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, INT'L SECURnY,
Summer 1999, at 5, 7. ("The United States is the first leading state in modern
international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components
of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical. To describe this
unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent
'moment' is profoundly mistaken.") (emphasis in original).
19. See Mark L. Haas, A Geriatric Peace? The Future of US. Power in a World ofAging
PopUtations, INT'L SEcuRrrY, Summer 2007, at 112, 112-13.
20. SeeJOSEPH S. NYE,JR., SoFT POWER: THE MEANSTO SuccEss INWORLD PoLITIcS,
at x (2004).
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being subject to diminution merely through the changed attitudes or
preferences of others. The importance of what non-Americans think
and feel about the United States is further underscored by the ability
of other countries, even otherwise weak ones, to resist the United
States and limit what it can accomplish overseas. It may be impossible
to assemble a coalition strong enough to outweigh the United States
according to most of the conventional measures of power, but other
21states curb the exercise of U.S. power in many less visible ways.
If, and when, the United States loses its preeminent rank will
depend in large measure on how the United States uses its power,
which is to say on U.S. policies. There are many aspects of this, but
two in particular are worthy of note. First, the United States risks
losing soft power to the extent it strays from the core values, including
those involving human rights and civil liberties, that have set it apart
from most other states. Second, although the active exercise of
influence overseas is a necessary and appropriate aspect of being a
superpower, overplaying one's hand overseas can endanger the very
power that makes such playing possible. This is a matter not only of
the resource strains from imperial overstretch but also of the resent-
ment and reaction of others.
21. See STEPHEN M. WALT, TAMING AMERICAN POWER: THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO
U.S. PRIMACY 109-79 (2006) (describing a variety a methods states might utilize to
oppose U.S. foreign policy that the United States cannot or will not respond to for
various reasons).
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